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MORAL PRACTICES:
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
JOSEPH HOOVER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Who has the authority to assign responsibility for international crimes?
There is a simple answer: international tribunals, in particular the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Yet this obvious response obscures further questions
regarding where the political authority to create international tribunals comes
from, as well as the vital moral question regarding how courts are constituted as
actors with the capacity to assign blame. In modern international politics,
authority has traditionally rested with states, meaning that rightful legal
1
institutions were created by states and justified by their consent. The ICC is
granted authority in this way, because it was created through a treaty negotiated
2
and signed by states. Such a procedural response, however, obscures as much
as it reveals about the politics and morality of assigning responsibility for
international crimes. Asking how a new international authority is constituted
and justified as an actor with the political power to try state officials and other
international criminals—and to thereby embody and defend supposedly
emergent norms of global justice—is a more contentious, difficult question that
takes us beyond questions of positive law.
In international law, there is also an account of the law’s authority based on
the moral claims it makes, which are intended to shape states and constrain
3
their power. The ICC belongs to this tradition as well. The fundamental issue I
want to explore in this article is how such moral authority is constituted in realworld institutions, particularly the authority to assign responsibility for
international crimes. This is a vital issue to consider if we want to understand
the ICC, its limits, and its place in the changing world of contemporary
international politics. From the beginning the idea of an international criminal
Copyright © 2014 by Joseph Hoover.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Lecturer and Course Director, M.A. International Politics & Human Rights, City University
London.
1. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, International Legal Order as an Idea, 73 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 253
(1979).
2. Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court art. 126, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into
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court was framed in legalistic terms, in both its founding and practical activities
4
to date. Now that the ICC is in operation it actively claims authority through its
defense of universal moral principles and pursuit of justice for victims of
violence. On this basis, authority is granted to the institution because it
embodies universal moral norms, which in turn constrain the actions of states,
5
leading to the reform of international politics. Supporters of the ICC
characterize the court as a victory of law over politics, and of morality over the
6
self-interests of states. This account of the ICC’s authority leaves us with
important issues to consider: How was such a victory for international law
possible? What are the court’s prospects for continued success? Should we
7
accept the claim that the ICC is a legal rather than political institution?
International courts are products of their time and place, created through
political compromise, responsive to particular crises, and dedicated to the
8
interests of particular actors. Despite rhetoric that insists that the ICC and
other international tribunals are (or should be) legal rather than political
9
institutions, a focus on the constitution of these courts reveals the way
preexisting social practices and power hierarchies structure their work. Placing
the ICC’s authority to assign responsibility in its social and political context
complicates our understanding of such authority and enables important lines of
criticism. I argue that rather than overcoming the politics of their creation, legal
institutions are indelibly shaped by them, and rather than escaping politics, legal
10
institutions like the ICC transpose politics into a legal register. These claims do
not make the attribution of responsibility impossible but they do push us to
consider the moral authority to make such attributions differently. The
conventional account of moral authority is seen as the just application of
rightful law, although the realities of politics may make the ideal exercise of that
11
authority difficult. The goal, nonetheless, is to make the law as impartial and
judicious as possible to ensure its separation from politics. An alternative way
of understanding moral and legal authority is to acknowledge its political
element, in the sense that the authority exercised is always the product of a
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 12–13 (1997).
5. ADAM BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS: WAR AND INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN
UGANDA 181–84 (2011) [hereinafter BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS].
6. Steven C. Roach, Value Pluralism, Liberalism, and the Cosmopolitan Intent of the International
Criminal Court, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 475, 483–84 (2005).
7. Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 942–46 (2010) [hereinafter Nouwen &
Werner, Doing Justice to the Political].
8. David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 410–17 (2007).
9. Alexander K. A. Greenwalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 586 (2007).
10. GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME 23–29 (2007).
11. Jamie Terence Kelly, The Moral Foundations of International Criminal Law, 9 J. HUM. RTS.
502, 504 (2010).
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decision to impose values upon others, which always remains a kind of violence
because those decisions are never universally or finally justifiable, but rather
12
are in some measure politically driven.
If we understand the capacity to assign moral responsibility as part of a
social practice, it is vital to understand the background conditions that partly
determine who can assume the privilege of assigning responsibility, while also
considering the effects those privileged actors have as they exercise their
authority. Understanding the assignation of responsibility as a social practice
requires us to identify the social relationships through which a particular
individual or institution gains the capacity to assign responsibility to culpable
agents who are then subject to punishment. Taking this approach allows us to
begin addressing the difficulty Jens Meierhenrich identifies in “attempting to
disaggregate the first permanent international criminal court by scrutinizing
various socially meaningful or otherwise significant aspects of its everyday
13
life.” In international politics, the historically dominant practice has been one
of “victor’s justice,” in which the authority of legal bodies and the punishments
14
they hand down is given by the force of arms possessed by the victorious state.
This practice has always provoked opposition and for advocates of international
criminal law the ICC represents a milestone in the long evolution from “victor’s
justice” to true international justice, in which the rule of law rather than the rule
15
of power becomes the basis for international politics. “The ICC reminds
governments that realpolitik, which sacrifices justice at the altar of political
16
settlements, is no longer accepted.” International criminal law seeks to
reconstruct this practice of assigning responsibility by moving towards the
effective rule of law and creating new moral actors, most vitally an independent
international court. In this article I argue that the shift in the social practice of
assigning responsibility that is sought through the ICC contains within it an
impossible renunciation of politics.
This shift in practice is explored by looking at the creation of the ICC. Using
the history of the founding of this landmark institution I trace its limits, the
power hierarchies that structure it as an actor capable of assigning
responsibility, and its importance for the development of practices of
international criminal law. The conclusion of this analysis is that the ICC, as a
12. See generally LAW AND AGONISTIC POLITICS (Andrew Schaap ed., 2009).
13. Jens Meierhenrich, The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 1, 4.
14. JOHN LAUGHLAND, HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRIALS: FROM CHARLES I TO SADDAM
HUSSEIN 252 (2008).
15. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 383–93 (2000).
16. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman, Drafting Comm., United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Address at the Ceremony for the
Opening of Signature of the Treaty on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xxi, xxi (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1999).

7 HOOVER (DO NOT DELETE)

266

3/19/2014 11:33 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:263

moral agent, is limited by its inability to acknowledge its own political power,
because its authority is premised on the separation of law and politics. As
former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo described his role,
I shall not be involved in political considerations . . . . It is the only way to build a
judicial institution, to help the political actors to perceive the legal limits. To facilitate
the work and planning of political actors, I inform them in advance of my next steps,
and ensure that my Office be transparent and predictable. However, my duty is to
17
apply the law without political considerations. Other actors have to adjust to the law.

This limitation in turn presents significant obstacles for the ICC’s goal of ending
impunity and raises questions about the promise of international justice for
those most directly affected by the conflicts where the ICC is involved. These
negative consequences are seen in the court’s actions in Uganda, where its first
18
arrest warrants were issued.
The ICC’s claim to authority rests on the renunciation of politics in favor of
the power of the law, which is justified by the law’s moral quality. International
criminal law’s moral quality is characterized by two distinct ends: first, the
elimination of impunity for individuals with state position and power, which
extends the rule of law to the international level, and second, responding to the
suffering of victims of atrocity and war by bringing those responsible to justice,
19
through punishment. These aims are intended to ensure the just application of
universal moral principles. In the discussions and official drafting documents
that led to the creation of the ICC, this moral authority was emphasized while
political authority, associated with partiality, compromise, and impunity, was
20
rejected. The difficulty this creates, and that is revealed when we think about
moral responsibility as a social practice, is that moral authority is always tied up
with other forms of social authority that must make use of coercion and
compromise, and is unavoidably partial. In practice the ICC must be a political
actor, but the way that its moral authority is constructed leads to a kind of
schizophrenia. Even in the terms set out by the ICC’s own ideals for moral
actors, the ICC is in practice inconsistent and contradictory. This can be seen in
the Uganda case, where the ICC had strong pragmatic reasons for choosing to
pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a first prosecution and to seek
close cooperation with the Ugandan government. These political choices raise
doubts about the ICC’s impartiality and capacity to serve the ends of
17. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Keynote Address at Council on
Foreign Relations 6 (Feb. 4, 2010) (transcript available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/MorenoOcampo.CFR.2.4.2010.pdf).
18. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant
of Arrest for Joseph Kony (Sept. 27, 2005), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf; Kony, Otti,
Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya (July 8, 2005),
http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.pdf; Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/0401/05, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.pdf;
Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.pdf.
19. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at pmbl.
20. MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
ACHIEVEMENT 129–30 (2006).
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international justice. Although the authority of the ICC is articulated through
the renunciation of politics, its exercise of authority is quintessentially political.
The court not only was constituted by states and through a process of
22
compromise and negotiation that has shaped it as an institution but also
exercises its legal authority to make choices on matters beyond the law: who to
prosecute, how conflicts are represented, and when to compromise to secure the
23
cooperation of states. In the end, I want to claim that attending to how the
ICC assigns responsibility in terms of social practice should lead us to
reconsider the law–politics relationship sought by international criminal law.
The agonistic character of international criminal law should be acknowledged.
This agonistic character suggests that the law never escapes politics and that
failing to embrace the political role of the ICC is damaging to this important
institution, because disavowing politics lends itself to naivety and a lack of selfcriticism.
There are a number of difficulties with the claims I am making here. First,
how does the ICC act as a moral agent? Second, how can I justify the claim that
the court is acting in the way I claim? Third, how can I show that the cause of
the court’s action has to do with how the ICC is constructed as a moral agent?
The truth is I cannot respond fully to these difficulties. In the first case,
speaking of the ICC as a moral agent is necessarily a shorthand for speaking of
the acts of individuals that take place within the ICC as an institution. In most
instances, I am talking about the prosecutor at the time in question, Luis
Moreno Ocampo, but this too is a simplification, given that those with whom he
conferred surely shaped his actions and decisions. A further issue is that there is
no record of his thoughts and actions, much less those of who he worked with—
the evidence available is very limited. Finally, with respect to the third
difficulty, I am not claiming that the way the ICC was constructed as a moral
agent is determinant, that it is a structural force bearing down on all those
involved, but rather that the initial act of construction shapes and constrains the
practice of the court and is important so far as we see the court’s claim to
authority made in terms of a rejection of politics. This self-understanding means
that the ICC struggles to be clear or open about its politics in its public
pronouncements, and one suspects even internally, though this is hard to judge
because of the lack of evidence. So, the argument presented here is not based in
a deep and long term empirical engagement with the court as an institution
simply because such work has not yet been done, though it is increasingly seen
24
as important and being attempted. Rather, my claims are based on available
21. BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 183–215.
22. See Antonio Cassese, The Statue of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 170–71 (1999).
23. Nouwen & Werner, Doing Justice to the Political, supra note 7, at 961–65.
24. This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems represents a move in that direction, as is
highlighted in Jens Meierhenrich’s The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, supra
note 13, at 1–5.
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textual evidence and a kind of conceptual analysis of the moral ideals that shape
the court. In light of these limitations, my conclusions are suggestive rather than
determinate.
II
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE
The link between morality and law is hardly simple or straightforward.
There are those who see the law as grounded in effective political authority and
its institutional execution, and for them moral claims are only ideological
25
justifications of authority; morality does not have its own power. International
criminal law starts from the opposing side of this claim. Its fundamental
justification is that there are some wrongs that are undeniable and, in turn,
26
norms that should be applicable everywhere. Assuming this link between
morality and law, in which moral principle provides justification for the social
power that the law exercises, the question of assigning moral responsibility
becomes central.
Moral theory, however, does not provide any one compelling understanding
of responsibility. The question moral philosophy commonly confronts is, Can
27
individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions? The typically
modern response is that they can so long as they acted freely and were capable
28
of knowing the morally right action. These presumptions are echoed in legal
norms, such as actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (the act is not culpable
unless the mind is guilty). This account of responsibility, in which moral
culpability is constructed from causal responsibility and blameworthiness, treats
responsibility as a quality of an individual actor. Philosophers have found two
fundamental problems with this account. First, it depends on the reality of free
29
will, because the responsible actor must be the cause of her own actions.
Second, it depends upon the universality of moral principles, which must be
30
known to any right-minded individual. Both of these assumptions have proven
problematic.
There is not space here to go into the philosophical debates on moral
responsibility, but neither is there any need to do so, because an identifiable

25. See CHINA MIÉLVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295–320 (2005).
26. David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International
Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 571 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010).
27. Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUD. 5, 5 (1994).
28. MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 72–104
(1992).
29. Strawson, supra note 27, at 21–22.
30. Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency, 74 PHIL. 311, 329
(1999).
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compatibilist compromise position has come to dominate. This compromise
suggests that although individuals’ actions are in many ways determined by
forces outside their control, individuals nonetheless maintain some capacity to
direct their actions and choices. Further, whether we see moral norms as
rational or conventional, there is an assumption that an individual can be
expected to know and respect some moral norms, meaning that the assignation
of responsibility is possible. What this compromise fails to account for is that
assigning responsibility becomes a political act once we no longer see it as a
discovery of a fact about the world. Rejecting the responsibility-as-fact concept
is especially important for the compatibilist position, because that position
acknowledges that both free will and moral principles are at least partly social
constructions, in which someone exercises power over someone else. Yet,
because this compromise position remains committed to the idea of
responsibility as a quality that individuals possess, it is not clear where or how
the political aspects of responsibility can be considered.
It is for this reason that some scholars have moved to think of moral
32
responsibility in different terms, namely as a social practice. This move is
based in the idea that when we hold each other responsible we are not really
concerned with larger philosophical questions of free will and rational morality,
but with influencing the actions of others (and ourselves). Understanding
responsibility as a social practice allows us to see how the act of holding each
other accountable to social norms is rooted in particular contexts and always
involves the exercise of power. The difficulties of dominant accounts of
responsibility are only exacerbated when we consider international crimes
33
involving collective actors and the mobilization of social groups. Therefore, it
is this understanding of moral responsibility as a social practice that I want to
use in thinking about the ICC and how it is able to claim the authority to hold
individuals accountable. In arguing for a social practice account of responsibility
I share the concern for moving beyond the impasse between theoretical
abstraction and naïve empiricism that Meierhenrich expresses in his
introduction to this issue, but I also stand slightly to the side of his central aim
34
because my analysis remains explicitly normative.
In previous work, I have argued for an understanding of moral responsibility
35
as a social practice rooted in John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy. The key
31. Randolph Clarke, On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 29 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 13, 19–20 (2005).
32. Responsibility has been addressed as a practice by those working in an Aristotelian tradition,
such as Alasdair MacIntyre, supra note 30, as well as a pragmatic tradition, as in the work of Marion
Smiley, supra note 28. Within contemporary moral philosophy, the work of Peter Strawson has been
very influential in motivating this move to focus on the act of holding others accountable as a social
practice. See PETER F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT, AND OTHER ESSAYS 1–28 (2008).
33. See ANTHONY F. LANG, JR., PUNISHMENT, JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45–57
(2008).
34. See generally Meierhenrich, supra note 13.
35. Joseph Hoover, Reconstructing Responsibility and Moral Agency in World Politics, 4 INT’L
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points I want to bring out here are twofold. First, when we think of
responsibility as a social practice the question of whether individuals possess
free will, and therefore can be causally responsible for an act, is transformed
into the question of whether individuals are enabled to be reflective in their
actions and whether social conditions grant them the capacity to act
purposefully. Second, thinking of responsibility as a social practice shifts our
attention away from the question of whether a moral norm is universally
binding as such and towards the question of the quality and consequences of the
moral ends we pursue. Assigning responsibility, then, is the social practice of
holding individuals to their proclaimed ends. Once we adopt this view, the task
of morality is not to find agents who can be held responsible or determine the
norms to which they must be accountable, but to consider the quality of our
social practices and the consequence of the ends we pursue.
A social-practice approach to responsibility brings the political elements of
assigning blame and holding accountable to the fore, and a number of scholars
have considered the distinctive difficulty of finding culpable agents when we are
concerned with addressing “international” crimes. The account of responsibility
that sees moral culpability as a quality that adheres to individuals cannot
adequately address the reality of mass crimes in which whole populations can
36
be seen as more or less culpable. For example, although soldiers may be
responsible for particular atrocities, their actions are enabled by other collective
actors, such as military leaders, state representatives, and democratic publics,
37
who are thus in a way responsible as well. These moves to reconsider
responsibility in world politics in terms of social practice are important, but they
also understate the role of power in constituting culpable actors through the
practices of international criminal law. Put another way, the focus on volitional
individuals who commit heinous crimes is not only a conceptual mistake, but it
also makes it all too easy to ignore structural causes of mass violence and the
role that powerful international actors have in instigating and prolonging
38
conflicts.
Paying attention to the construction of culpable agents, however, reveals
only half of emerging practices of international responsibility. The actor who is
able to assign responsibility, and in turn empowered to construct and limit
which causes of conflict are to be addressed, is also socially constructed and
defined by existing conditions and power hierarchies. So, whereas in previous
work I have argued that accepting the idea of individual culpability in the
practice of prosecuting international crimes obscures the social conditions that
enable conflict and preserves the power inequalities that limit what the pursuit
THEORY 233, 254–56 (2012).
36. Kirsten Ainley, Excesses of Responsibility: The Limits of Law and the Possibilities of Politics,
25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 407, 409 (2011).
37. Neta C. Crawford, Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military
Atrocity, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 187, 188–89 (2007).
38. Hoover, supra note 35, at 252–54.
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of international justice can achieve, in this article I focus on how the authority
to hold responsible is constructed. To begin this work two things are needed:
First, an account of what practices we are concerned with, and second, an
understanding of what is meant by a social practice.
The first concern is answered by looking to the emerging practices of
international criminal law and the way that international courts are constituted.
Courts deliver judgments of culpability based on the assignment of
responsibility made by prosecutors. So, the moral question is, how are they
justified? What gives legal institutions the authority to hold us responsible?
These questions are answered in many different ways by competing accounts of
the law, but my focus will be on the way the authority of international courts is
justified in their founding documents and practices of prosecution. In this
instance I am looking at the ICC as a landmark institution in the development
of international criminal law because it is the first permanent international
criminal court and as such its authority had to be explicitly justified at the time
of its creation, and continues to be justified in practice. The work done here is
only an initial opening, because digging into the full complexity of the practice
of holding responsible at the ICC would require more extensive fieldwork.
Although my analysis here falls short of Meierhenrich’s injunction to move
from desk based research to field research, it does provide a framework for how
39
scholars interested in distinctly moral practice might begin such work. How I
judge the ICC requires more explanation, which is why I now turn to the
question of how analyzing responsibility in terms of social practice enables us to
evaluate the moral quality of our practices.
In looking at responsibility as a social practice I draw on Dewey’s ethical
thinking. Although Dewey did not use the language of practice in his ethics, he
did set out a theory of ethics that was practical and social. Dewey suggested that
the work of ethics begins with an understanding of how norms function socially
40
and how ethical ideals are practically viewed within a society. Dewey’s notion
of responsibility is focused on the importance of holding individuals
accountable to social norms, while also encouraging moral reflection on both
41
the means by which this work is done and the ethical ends society pursues. In
this way, we can see Dewey as offering an account of responsibility as a social
practice. An important part of the practice of responsibility is the institutional
context in which society holds individuals responsible, notably considering who
is able to hold others accountable and how such authority is granted and its
social consequences. I want to suggest that we can use Dewey’s ethical theory to
develop a practical method for analyzing the value of the ICC as an institution
with the authority to assign responsibility.
39. Meierhenrich, supra note 13, at 4–5.
40. JOHN DEWEY, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 1900–1901, at 88–92 (1991).
41. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 315–18 (2002).
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Dewey’s method of ethical intelligence begins with identifying a problematic
situation, looking for the practical concern to which ethical and political action
42
responds. In the case of the ICC we can consider both the perceived need for
such a court, which is a central part of its justification, as well as the problems
generated by the court’s actions. The ICC was created as a response to the
commission of atrocities worldwide, and particularly as a way to end the
impunity many perpetrators of atrocity enjoyed. Criticism of the court has
focused on whether it has been able to effectively achieve its ends and whether
43
it is sufficiently attentive to the victims of atrocity. To evaluate the court and
the criticisms leveled against it, we can follow Dewey’s general approach.
First, consideration should be given to the context in which the ICC was set
up, including its aims and means, as well as the social and political dynamic in
which the court was created. This analysis also includes a consideration of
historical context, considering how the ICC responds to and embodies existing
practices. Second, this analysis should look to how well the professed aims of
the court are met by the prescribed means, giving special attention to
unexpected consequences. This reflection is important for tracing the width of
the gap that can open up between the aims of an institution and the
consequences of its practical action. Importantly, this gap can appear even in
cases where the aims and means are pursued sincerely and effectively, because
practical action to address a problem, like international impunity, can alter our
overall evaluation of the aims towards which a particular moral practice is
oriented. After a reflective analysis of the practice of the court, a Deweyan
approach asks us to evaluate the institution and practice in question, in terms of
whether it achieves its ends and the consequences of its activities. This process
of valuation is always done with more general moral values in mind and should
focus on the wider consequence of a particular institution or practice. In this
case, does the ICC make world politics more just or peaceful by some measure,
and how does it affect the social and political relationships between the actors
involved? In my own analysis I focus on whether the ICC is an authority that
enables effective responses to atrocity and to what extent it engenders greater
equality and control for those who suffer those atrocities. Finally, a valuation of
the ICC provides a basis to suggest further reconstruction and, most
importantly, further practical action to improve upon the failings of the court.
In evaluating the ICC as an institution with the authority to assign
responsibility, I consider both the founding of the court and its first arrest
warrants, applying a pragmatic method of analysis to both grasp the practices of
responsibility that the court is a part of, and to consider its achievements and
limitations.

42. See JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 107–23 (2004).
43. David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 118, 119
(2011).
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III
THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The creation of the ICC was something of a surprise. Supporters of the idea
of a permanent international criminal court had struggled for years to generate
44
interest and support for such a court. It is clear that in historical perspective
the ICC is a response to the need to address the impunity of those who commit
atrocities and an important component of an international legal system that
45
protects universal human rights and seeks justice for the victims of atrocity.
What is less clear is why in 1998 the ICC was seen as a necessary institution,
even among states whose sovereign authority would be undermined by the
court. There is a simple and comforting story that could be told about the
advance of international law and human-rights norms in the post–Cold War era,
but this would obscure more than it illuminates. Rather, I want to suggest there
were a number of different actors who were supportive of the court, and each
for rather different reasons.
First, there were individual advocates for an international criminal court
(academics, lawyers, politicians, and activists) who were able to put the idea
back on the agenda at the UN and proved instrumental in garnering support
from states and global civil society. Second, the UN itself, particularly the
International Law Commission (ILC) and the General Assembly (GA), was
supportive of the idea of a permanent court that could not only bring
enforcement powers to bear in defense of the international legal norms, but
could also relieve some of the strain that the organization faced in trying to
respond to atrocities in an ad hoc manner. Third, an increasing number of states
were sympathetic to the idea, both to develop humanitarian and human rights
law, and to defer some of the responsibility and cost of responding to atrocities
to an international institution. Finally, global civil society, particularly the
coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that became known as the
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), was able to mobilize
wider sentiment in favor of the court and advocate for its necessity as an
institution that could alter international politics by enforcing international law
in service of moral ends. The diversity of reasons why the court was seen as a
necessary project is important because even while the synergy of interests
helped bring it to realization, the divergence in how the court was envisioned
reveals how the ICC embodies competing projects and was defined from the
beginning by political calculations.

44. Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two
Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 3–4
(1999).
45. See generally Herman von Hebel, An International Criminal Court – A Historical Perspective,
in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS
13 (Herman A. M. Hebel, Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., 1999).
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Trinidad’s Prime Minister Arthur Robinson, along with Robert Woetzel,
Ben Ferencz, and M. Cherif Bassiouni, initiated the GA request for a draft
46
statute of a permanent international criminal court from the ILC. Originally,
the proposal was framed as a way of dealing with the specific crime of drug
trafficking, but those involved ensured that the wording was left broad, so that
47
other crimes could eventually be included. The passage of the resolution was,
however, hardly a guarantee that anything substantive would come out of the
discussions with the ILC. Bassiouni was particularly influential in the process,
48
setting up an informal group of experts that provided its own draft statute,
stepping in as chairman of the ILC after the first chairman quit, and securing
49
outside resources for the project. Creating a permanent international court
was a lifelong goal for Bassiouni and he did much intellectual and practical
50
work to make it a reality. Looking at the importance of individuals reveals
that, although the ICC is by no means the work of one man, it is nonetheless a
highly idealistic institution supported by the conviction of particular individuals
as much as it is by states or a wider community concerned with the development
51
of international criminal law.
52
Other important individuals include Adriaan Bos, who chaired the
Preparatory Committee meetings that laid the groundwork for the Rome
Conference, and Philippe Kirsch, who was the chairman at the Rome
53
Conference. In both cases, the individual commitment and political skill of
these men ensured that the creation of the court was neither delayed nor
undermined by powerful state interests. They were vital to maintaining the
momentum of the drafting as it went from being yet another proposal at the
ILC to a treaty approved at the Rome Conference. William Pace, who led the
CICC, was another individual who shaped the drafting process and the
constitution of the ICC. He was essential in engaging global civil-society actors
and coordinating their contributions, which included providing technical
assistance to states, mobilizing public sympathy, and galvanizing support from a
54
broad spectrum of NGOs. This shows how the court was partly a response to a
problem perceived more by individuals than international institutions, states, or
the wider public. Further, the leadership of these individuals influenced the
aims and means adopted by the ICC, grounding its authority in moral terms and
46. GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 10–11.
47. Id.
48. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute: International Criminal Tribunal, in THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 759, 759–93
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
49. GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 12.
50. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 9–10.
51. Id. at 8–10.
52. Christopher Keith Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 125 (1998).
53. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 27–28.
54. GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 26–27.
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focusing on the court’s potential to transform international politics. Their
emphasis on the independence of the court and its potential to undermine
traditional notions of sovereignty, however, challenges the authority of the
states that the court depends on practically to do its business.
These influential individuals, however, were hardly operating in a vacuum.
An international criminal court had first been on the UN agenda in 1948, at the
time of the passage of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, when the plan for such a court was first referred to the ILC
56
for consideration. The ILC helped to develop the legal thinking that went into
57
the ICC and kept the hope for a court alive while it was a political
58
impossibility. Additionally, the GA’s support was influential, particularly in
insulating the court from the interests of the permanent members of the UN
59
Security Council (UNSC). So, even while the initiation of the drafting process
was left up to the effort of dedicated individuals, the UN provided an
institutional space in which the court was seen as a way to fulfill the
organization’s mission of protecting human rights while ensuring international
peace and security.
The sense of urgency and possibility around the drafting of the ICC had
something to do with events at the UN. As the organization’s activities
expanded with the end of the Cold War and it was called upon to respond to
humanitarian crises and human-rights abuses, the need for a permanent court
60
increased. This should not, however, be taken to show that the UN’s actions
were purely moral—particularly among UNSC members, part of the appeal of a
permanent international court was that it would ease the burden of responding
to international crises in an ad hoc way, both by building up a reliable
61
infrastructure and passing some of the responsibility to a new institution. The

55. See generally William R. Pace, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and
Non-Governmental Organizations, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS, supra note 45, at 189.
56. Hebel, supra note 45, at 21–26.
57. See generally Rep. of the Expert Grp. to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and
Functioning of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Int’l Tribunal for
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Expert Group]; Study on Ways
and Means of Ensuring the Implementation of International Instruments Such as the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Including the
Establishment of the International Jurisdiction Envisaged by the Convention, Comm’n on Human
Rights, Ad Hoc Working Grp. of Experts & Special Comm. Against Apartheid, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1426 (Jan. 19, 1981); Rep. of the 1953 Comm. on Int’l Criminal Jurisdiction, July 27–Aug. 20,
1953, U.N. Doc. A/2645; GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (1954) (containing draft of Rome statute);
Rep. of the Comm. on Int’l Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 1–31, 1951, annex I, U.N. Doc. A/2136; GAOR,
7th Sess., Supp. No. 11 (1952) (containing draft of Rome statute).
58. Hebel, supra note 45, at 26–27.
59. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 23–24.
60. Bassiouni, supra note 4Error! Bookmark not defined., at 55–59.
61. Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 167, 169–70 (1995).
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UN’s role reveals another important tension at the heart of the ICC: Although
there was a real commitment to the development of international criminal law,
there was also a political goal of transferring responsibility, as much as
authority, to an institution with potentially very little power to effectively
enforce the law.
Perhaps the most surprising feature of the drafting of the ICC was that so
many states were supportive. This support, however, was characterized by
important tensions. There were a number of states that were committed to the
idea of a permanent and independent court. Eventually becoming known as the
like-minded group (LMG), the states involved expanded throughout the
drafting process and supported the court in hopes of building the rule of law
internationally, spurred on by atrocities seen in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as well as a sense of completing the institutional protection for human
62
rights originally envisioned in 1948. Within the LMG there was important
variation. The group included European states long committed to the
development of international law (such as the Netherlands and Germany),
states from the global south keen to support a court they hoped would be
independent from the UNSC and the influence of powerful states (especially in
South America and Africa), and states more recently convinced of the need for
an international court (such as the United Kingdom, which joined late in the
process on the back of the developing consensus and changes in domestic
63
leadership). These states cooperated with global civil-society actors, fought to
preserve the independence of the ICC from the UNSC, worked to establish the
independence of the court’s prosecutor, and insisted on a wider jurisdiction
than some would have preferred.
Although the LMG proved that the court had support from states, many
others were less supportive. Yet, despite their reticence, there were few serious
attempts by powerful states to obstruct the drafting process. This is in part due
to the political events at the time. High-profile atrocities had made the issue of
64
responding to such events an issue that was hard to ignore. The success of the
ICC was partly due to circumstances. Its necessity and the moral imperative for
reform were strengthened by events rather than the concentrated efforts of
individuals or states. The lack of resistance was also political. In particular, the
United States offered cautious support for the project, not wanting to appear
callous in the face of atrocities, and also convinced that a permanent
international court with limited powers could prove useful for states, providing
65
a minimally demanding way of responding to events. Even countries that had
never signed the Rome Statute (and still have not) like India, Russia, and China
involved themselves in the negotiations, seeking to shape rather than simply
62.
63.
64.
65.

Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 20–21.
GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 49–51.
Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 3–4.
Id. at 17.
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oppose the court. In the end, the political context of the ICC’s creation has
engendered persistent tensions: First, there remain important inequalities
between supportive states, particularly between European states who provide a
good deal of the financial backing to the court and African states who are thus
far the only states being investigated; second, powerful states that are not party
to the Rome Statute (especially the permanent members of the UNSC),
continue to use the court for their own ends, which may have little to do with
67
expanding the rule of law or seeking justice for victims of atrocity.
There was also a counterpressure coming from global civil society, which
opposed the instrumentalization of the court by states. Operating under the
CICC, civil-society groups represented a wider concern than that of specific
individuals or the UN. Supportive groups came to the drafting process with a
number of concerns, though human-rights advocacy and international-law
groups were dominant. What united them was a desire for a court independent
68
of state control. Judging the impact of global civil society is complex, because
although there is a consensus that the efforts of the CICC to provide
information and advocacy were fundamental to the success of the Rome
69
Statute, the ends of those involved were hardly homogenous. Global civil
society’s importance shows that the ICC was seen as a necessary institution by a
relatively large number of people. This gives some credence to claims that the
court represents the interests of humanity. However, such statements elide the
partiality of the groups most involved, who tended to be from wealthy Western
countries and who can hardly be said to unequivocally or unproblematically
70
speak on behalf of “humanity.”
There were many different reasons for supporting the creation of the ICC,
such that the court was not a single response to a single problem. Yet as the
statute of the ICC was drafted and the institution came into being, an account
71
of the aims and means of the court was needed. Keeping the context of the
process in mind, we can see that the stated aims of the court obscure as much as
they reveal. The drafting process and the documents produced therein gave rise
to rhetoric of common endeavor, which is laid out in the ends the court claims
to serve. The extreme and pervasive violence of the twentieth century, enabled
by a lawless international order and the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators, are
designated as the problem the court is responding to, giving rise to its necessity.
In order to respond to the violence and impunity of international politics, the
66. Id. at 17–19.
67. Mark Kersten, A Fatal Attraction? The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P
and the International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (Jeff
Handmaker & Karin Arts eds., forthcoming 2014).
68. GLASIUS, supra note 20, at 27.
69. Id.
70. Marlies Glasius, What is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and Victim Responses
to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 496 (2009).
71. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 44, at 33–34.
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ICC resolves to hold those most responsible for international crimes
accountable to the international community, and in doing so to bring justice to
72
the victims and deter future violence. These are the ethical aims of the ICC,
the ends to which it is dedicated in principle and practice. Importantly, these
aims provide the deeper justification for the court’s authority, beyond the
agreement of the states that signed the Rome Statute.
The means for achieving these ends are set out in the ICC’s founding
document, which is focused on the need to extend the rule of law to the
international level and to punish those responsible for atrocities. These
intertwined projects of improving the procedures of international criminal law,
moving away from “victor’s justice,” and punishing responsible individuals,
73
were seen as vital to achieving the court’s aims. Central to this work is
maintaining the separation of law from politics, because the court’s means of
achieving its ends are premised on the neutrality and fairness of the legal
process as well as the justness of the punishments imposed. Although the aims
and means of the court fit well together in official statements, there are real
problems with the details of its practice.
The ICC claims to promote the rule of law by being a court of last resort,
stepping in when states are unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes of
international concern, but this much-discussed principle of complementarity
says little about the standards that must be met by domestic prosecutions to
74
pass the threshold of being able to prosecute crimes. This creates a problem
because nearly any minimally legal proceeding would seem to circumvent the
ICC’s jurisdiction, making it very difficult for the ICC to pursue cases where
states are unwilling to prosecute cases in a thorough and rigorous way,
75
especially if those states are powerful. Further, by not having a clear measure
of competency, the ICC is open to manipulation by states that invoke the ICC’s
jurisdiction for their own political gain rather than out of any real inability to
conduct a domestic trial. For weaker states the ICC can provide legitimacy to
the government and improve the state’s ability to gain assistance from other
states and international institutions, because working with the ICC can be used
to show concern for international law and a willingness to follow international
76
norms.
Within the idea of complementarity we find one of the big difficulties the
ICC faces: Its authority is drawn from its ability to enforce the rule of law upon
state representatives, but the practice of the court protects the power of states.
72. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, at pmbl, arts. 1, 5 & 27.
73. Cassese, supra note 22, at 170–71.
74. Id. at 158–59.
75. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 17, ¶ 2 (setting out the definition of unwilling, which is not
very demanding and allows a lot of scope for interpretation).
76. See Sarah Nouwen & Wouter Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals, in COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 255, 257–60 (Alette Smeulers ed., 2010)
[hereinafter Nouwen & Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals].
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The idea of complementarity leaves the meaning and quality of domestic law to
states at the same time that the court claims to be the embodiment of a
77
universal law. A successful court, short of being one with no cases (as Ocampo
78
famously said), is one whose authority is not coercive, such that states either
try cases domestically or willingly submit cases to the ICC via referrals from
state parties or the UNSC. In practice, even proprio motu referrals depend
upon cooperation, either of the state under investigation, or of states powerful
enough to force the offending state to comply. One could accept this limitation
more sanguinely if the court were dedicated to improving the quality of
domestic courts and building the capacity of states to uphold the rule of law—
even though in this case the ICC would look less like an independent
international court and more like a conventional international institution
focused on capacity building.
The issue of punishment is also troubling because its justification is unclear
and its effectiveness is hard to confirm. If the point of punishment is deterrence,
then the ICC is undermined by its dependence on states to enforce its arrest
warrants. (It has no independent power in such matters, a point made clear
79
80
when President Omar Al Bashir travelled to Chad and Kenya —both parties
to the ICC—without incident.) Further, the evidence that the threat of
prosecution can deter international crime is questionable. It is not clear how the
threat of prosecution is effectively communicated and whether it changes the
81
calculations of those committing atrocities in contexts of mass violence. Other
justifications for punishment are likewise problematic. The sentences the court
is able to hand out may not be appropriately retributive for the crimes it
pursues, if any prison sentence could be for acts of genocide, crimes against
82
humanity and war crimes. The ICC’s first conviction tells the story. Thomas
Lubanga was convicted for war crimes relating to the use of child soldiers in his
militia, but was sentenced to only fourteen years with time served, meaning he
83
will be free in eight years. In such a case it is hard not to feel that Ocampo has
oversold his accomplishment when he says, “An international court investigated

77. Cassese, supra note 22, at 159.
78. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR 4 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b2560aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf.
79. Mariana Rodriguez Pareja, Al-Bashir to Visit Chad… Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27,
2013, 12:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mariana-rodriguez-pareja/albashir-to-visit-chadag_b_2750846.html.
80. Court Worry at Omar Al-Bashir’s Kenya Trip, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2010, 8:09 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11117662.
81. Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of the International Justice, 24
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191, 192–93 (2010).
82. Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L.
561, 579 (2002).
83. DR Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, BBC NEWS, (Jul. 10, 2012, 12:38
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726.
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the suffering of some of the most vulnerable members of humanity - children in
war zones . . . . The court provided a fair trial to the suspect and convicted him.
84
It is a victory for humanity.” Ocampo’s comments also highlight the difficulty
of knowing for whom the ICC prosecutes. Punishment is meted out in an
international space and to international standards, severing the link between
punishment and the society and individuals affected. However much we may
want to put convictions in context and see it as one step in a larger process, the
victory for humanity and for those affected by violence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) is modest.
The aim of holding the perpetrators of atrocity to account is obviously
appealing, but again the ICC runs into serious practical problems on this point.
Although the court claims political independence, it not only is dependent upon
the willingness of states to apprehend suspects but also is pursuing a political
project of its own that may have very little to do with the victims affected by
violence. The issue of punishment highlights this point: When the ICC is
operating effectively it should remove an individual suspect from the society in
which his alleged crimes are committed, taking him to The Hague to stand trial
before an international panel of judges and, if convicted, sentencing him
according to international standards, and holding him in custody in a foreign
country. Whatever one thinks of the merits of this project, the court does not
adequately acknowledge its politics on this point. The implicit idea is that the
international community, referred to in the abstract as “humanity,” has priority
85
in seeking punishment and in finding justice. Further, by focusing on the acts
of individuals the ICC presents a very limited view of the causes of conflict, one
that also happens to excuse systemic causes and the influences of outside
institutions and states. We need not attribute malicious motives to the court’s
political project for this to be problematic. The ICC’s project is played out in an
existing context in which powerful states are able to influence the court’s
actions, which suggests that there are deep reasons why it has tended to focus
on weak African countries, lending credence to the complaint that the ICC is a
86
court for European states to put African leaders on trial. This is a disturbing
possibility given the stated aims of the ICC.
The concerns discussed thus far regarding the constitution of the ICC’s
authority to hold individuals responsible have been conceptual, looking at how
the competing motivations that led to the creation of the court and the way in
which its stated aims and means create problems for the court in practice.
Following a Deweyan line of analysis, it is important to look at the
consequences of the ICC’s practical activity to judge how far the concerns
84. Henry Ridgwell, Lubanga Conviction Boosts ICC – But Weaknesses Remain, VOICE OF AM.
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/lubanga-conviction-boosts-icc---but-weaknessesremain-142819925/181219.html.
85. SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 14 (2006).
86. Kurt Mills, “Bashir is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS.
Q. 404, 432–33 (2012).
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raised thus far have proven warranted, as well as to consider ways in which the
moral ends and practices of the court might be reconstructed. To do this fully
would require far more space than is available here, so I focus on the ICC’s first
arrest warrants, issued for Joseph Kony and other leaders of the LRA to give
some indication of the moral issues the ICC faces.
The key issue I want to focus on is how the authority of the ICC is premised
on its abdication of politics—refusing to admit its political power and role—and
claiming of authority through the nonpolitical moral and legal ends pursued.
Yet politics is central to the court’s actions; It must choose whom to prosecute,
draw distinctions between worthy victims, and distinguish the most culpable
perpetrators. The court will inevitably make compromises and exert its power
in potentially violent ways, and it must also seek favor with other interested
actors, such as the United States or the UNSC. Therefore, the ICC’s disavowal
of politics is potentially limiting. The ICC risks being ineffective and
manipulated by other political actors if it is naïve on these matters. More
importantly, the court’s failure to recognize or acknowledge its own political
power means that the depoliticization brought about by its appeal to moral and
legal authority is obscured, potentially hiding negative consequences such as the
court’s tendency to disempower victims and act as a judicial institution of the
strong to be used against the weak. These issues are explored in more depth
with regards to the ICC’s actions in Uganda.
IV
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY: UGANDA AND THE ICC
Given the importance of appearing to uphold the neutrality of the law and
the universality of its moral ends, the ICC faced more difficulty than a normal
court in choosing its first cases. The first case the court pursued was going to be
a test for the new institution. It would be a response to questions of whether the
ICC could function independently and whether new forms of international
justice were possible. In the end, the ICC had a number of cases to choose from
87
as states began to refer cases to the court very quickly. This act of choosing
was the first exercise of the court’s political as well as moral and legal authority.
At first glance, the referral of the LRA from the Ugandan government to the
ICC seemed an obvious choice. The Ugandan government was supportive of
the investigation, the United States was not going to block the referral despite
its assistance to Uganda, and the persons accused were notorious for the
88
brutality in the long-running Ugandan civil war. Joseph Kony made an
excellent target for prosecution, his atrocities were shocking and well known,
and he was unquestionably the most important leader in the LRA. Therefore,
Uganda fit the ends of the court quite well. Court officials hoped that bringing
87. Nouwen & Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals, supra note 76, at 255–57.
88. TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S
RESISTANCE ARMY 82–83 (2006).
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top LRA leaders to justice would not only punish these criminals and deter
future violence from rebel groups in the country, but also contribute to the
89
peace process and providing a sense of closure for the LRA’s victims. Being
able to frame their first case in these terms allowed the court, and its
prosecutor, to act on the declared ends of the court without offering much
reason for concern regarding the possibility of unexpected negative
consequences.
What this focus on the ideal qualities of the Uganda case obscures is that
this was also a decision that was deeply political. The ICC could have started
elsewhere and they could have handled the proceedings differently. It is a
common refrain from the ICC that their choice of cases are dictated by the
interests of justice, not political calculations about what is best for the court, but
90
that plea is unconvincing. The ICC makes important decisions about whether a
case is sufficiently grave to warrant their intervention and distinguishes between
perpetrators who are more or less responsible, meaning the court must make
decisions about the nature of the atrocities being committed and their cause.
There are no clear guidelines on how these decisions are made and little record
of the reasoning used by the prosecutor. Also, the decisions the ICC makes
have consequences on those most directly affected by the events they are
investigating, but the court prioritizes prosecution (in the name of justice) over
concerns about peace and reconciliation, or relief for victims, despite having
91
discretion on these matters in principle. These problems are not fatal to the
court’s worth, or its moral quality. The legal process itself can address them to
some degree, which will be seen in what follows. The central point, however, is
that the court is a political actor, it makes distinctions and wields power that not
only go beyond the law but also reveal that the appeal to law and morality is
itself political.
In publically denying its political power and the importance of political
calculations to its work, the ICC risks complicity with the very state authority it
claims to constrain. This complicity is evidenced by Ocampo’s appearance with
Ugandan President Museveni in London in January 2004 for the announcement
92
of the ICC’s investigation in Uganda. That moment conveyed the message that
the ICC would not be investigating the government for potential crimes, despite
accusations that the army had committed atrocities in northern Uganda and
that the Ugandan government had supported rebel groups operating in the
DRC. The court’s defense has been that it is focused on the most serious
crimes, but again how this is determined is not known and the pressures to work
89. BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 184–85.
90. Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of
Accountability in Uganda and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 682–83 (2009).
91. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 9 (2007),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/772c95c9-f54d-4321-bf09-73422bb23528/143640/
iccotpinterestsofjustice.pdf.
92. Peskin, supra note 90, at 655–57.
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closely with the Ugandan government are substantial. First, the court is
dependent upon the government for access to Uganda, without which
investigations would have been impossible. Also, the court needs state support
if it hopes to apprehend Kony and the other suspects; this effort has required
cooperation from the Ugandan military. Beyond these practical reasons for
cooperating with the government there is also the political message to be
communicated that the ICC is not a threat to its supporters, reassuring them
that bringing a case to the ICC will not result in the referring state finding itself
under investigation. In Uganda we can see how this was good for both the
government and the court: The ICC got its first case, helping it to establish its
legitimacy, while the Ugandan government received international legitimacy
and assistance in defeating its political opponents.
In terms of pursuing its stated moral aims, the ICC’s complicity with the
Ugandan government is troubling because the court’s moral authority is based
on its claim to end impunity and serve the interests of victims, both of which are
compromised. It was originally thought that self-referrals would be rare at the
94
ICC, because it was assumed that states would not want to allow an
international court to try their nationals, much less to potentially investigate
their government. But this assumption only holds if the court does not
compromise and maintains the separation of law and politics. The court’s
compromise and corresponding failure to attend to government atrocities in
Uganda suggests that the court serves the interest of the government and of
itself, not the interest in the rule of law or in the needs of victims. The rule of
law is compromised because it is applied unequally (to the LRA leaders but not
the government troops) and the needs of victims are compromised because the
ends of legitimizing the ICC and securing the Ugandan government against its
enemies are prioritized over putting an end to violence or taking care of the
victims. Part of the problem in this instance is that the ICC has seemed
unprepared for the political purposes that states would seek to serve by
engaging with the court, which suggests that they have been naïve in not
anticipating the political benefit states would find in bringing cases to the ICC.
Uganda’s government was able to garner military assistance, curry international
favor, and marginalize its enemies by using the moral authority of the ICC. The
court has seemed either unwilling to recognize or unwilling to accept this
95
conclusion.
The problem, however, goes deeper. The court is set up in such a way that if
it were to act against the interests of states, it would struggle to be effective.
Despite the moral justifications for the court’s authority, which speak of a law
that transcends state sovereignty, the court is thoroughly deferential to states.
The principle of complementarity gives the first right and responsibility of
93. Id. at 678–89.
94. Nouwen & Werner, The Law and Politics of Self-Referrals, supra note 76.
95. Nouwen & Werner, Doing Justice to the Political, supra note 7, at 948.
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prosecution to states, and the focus on individuals diverts attention away from
97
institutional and social causes of violence. This reflects a wider failure of the
idea of international justice that the court is poised to deliver. First, as was the
case in Uganda, the ICC’s involvement has ambiguous consequences for the
victims of violence. The people of northern Uganda, especially the Acholi,
suffered most in Uganda’s civil war but their interest and needs were not well
98
served by the ICC. It is unclear that ICC prosecutions did much for them
because it arguably made the violence in the region worse rather than better by
discouraging LRA militias from agreeing a peace deal. Second, it is not at all
clear that having figures like Kony stand trial in The Hague serves their interest
in seeing justice done. Third, the lack of attention to the government’s actions
and the complicity of international institutions that have funded the
displacement camps have meant that the underlying conditions that led to
99
violence in Uganda have not been addressed.
Instead the authority of the state is reaffirmed and the interests of the
international community are given priority. First, ICC involvement brands the
LRA leaders as criminals, thereby encouraging and justifying the use of further
violence to bring those leaders to justice. Second, ICC involvement promotes
the conception of justice as international accountability rather than local justice
for those most affected, or peace for that matter. Put another way, the ICC uses
its moral and legal authority to pursue a vision of justice that is seen as superior
100
to that sought by those affected. The ICC imports moral norms and models of
legal efficiency that do seek the participation or knowledge of those involved
but presume the superiority of international justice, which is itself made
possible by powerful states. This dynamic risks perpetuating colonial modes of
domination. The focus on international justice and building the capacity of the
state tends to not only disempower victims, who are seen as passive, but also to
portray the LRA as composed of irrational savages and criminals without
101
legitimate grievances. Further, even as the ICC has privileged the Ugandan
state, its modes of intervention undermine democratic authority in the country
by playing into preexisting dynamics of aid dependency, economic and military
intervention from international community, and the necessity of forms of
external governance.
This brief consideration of the ICC’s intervention in Uganda shows that
there are serious unintended consequences of the court’s pursuit of its moral
ends. There is definitely some room for improvement as the court becomes
more adept in its work. For example, the naïveté shown by too readily
96. Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L
AFF. 179, 187 (2007) [hereinafter Branch, Uganda’s Civil War].
97. Hoover, supra note 35, at 257–59.
98. BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 191–94
99. Branch, Uganda’s Civil War, supra note 96, at 181–82.
100. BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 195.
101. Id. at 214–15.
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embracing the Ugandan government is relatively simple to overcome by being
more attentive to the benefits that states may be seeking in referring a case to
the ICC.
However, there are also more serious problems with the ICC’s pursuit of
moral ends. At least in Uganda, the court has been shown to be too deferential
to the interests of states and too inattentive to the victims of violence. This is a
damning indictment because it undermines the aims and authority of the court.
There are many ways we can seek to address this problem, but I want to focus
again on the ICC’s denial of political motivations as a key cause, because this
denial is contradictory. The court wields political power and must make
political decisions to achieve its ends, which are not necessarily given in a
singular or comprehensive way by the court’s founding texts. If this is correct,
then the court needs to acknowledge the power it has and articulate its ends as a
political as well as a moral and legal project.
V
CONCLUSION
Considering how the ICC claims and exercises its authority to hold
individuals responsible reveals important limitations upon the court’s capacity
as a moral actor. Most importantly, the court’s moral authority is premised on
the distance it maintains from politics by focusing on the impartial application
of the law in the name of universal principles, but this distance is undermined in
practice. The court’s inability to maintain an apolitical stance is not simply the
product of inevitable practical compromise. Rather, this inability reveals
important problems with how the ICC claims moral authority. First, the ICC,
like all social institutions pursuing moral ends, is complex and embodies
multiple ends and divergent projects. Claiming to have a clear moral purpose
supported by a wide consensus does the ICC no favors, because the practical
reality is that its actions will be inconsistent at times and that pursuing
international justice through high-profile trials of individual perpetrators is a
political project in its own right. Second, the ICC’s claim to represent humanity
in its pursuit of international justice obscures the partiality of the project. Ideals
of humanity and justice are defined in particular ways that reflect important
power inequalities. The ICC serves many interests through such claims, partly
as a counterhegemonic institution that nonhegemonic states have used as a way
to bolster their ethical status with respect to hegemonic states like the United
States, Russia, and China. Also, the ICC serves the interests of powerful states
by providing further justifications for intervention in the global south,
particularly in African states. Yet this dynamic is exploited by weaker states,
which are able to use international attention and support for their own
purposes. Third and finally, the ICC’s apolitical stance obscures the fact that the
interests of an international court are not necessarily the same as those of the
victims of violence that the court claims to represent. This is the most morally
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troubling limitation of the court because it reflects not only the reality that
moral aims are always pursued in the real world but also that there may be
something fundamentally troubling in the ends the court is seeking to realize.
International justice as an ideal presumes that there are principles and ends
that are universally desirable, and that the realization of those principles and
ends requires forms of global authority. This framing will always leave open the
possibility that the powerful dictate to the weak, and the justifications of law
and morality cannot alter this, which is why the political mechanisms through
which international justice is realized are vital. If international justice is actually
going to be about preventing future violence and serving the needs of victims,
then it needs to find a way to provide an international level of protection and
action that includes the knowledge, values and needs of those affected by
violence. This is the primary critique that a Deweyan analysis leads us to, that
the ICC, for all its potential, does not enable those subject to violence to exert
greater control over their lives, and it does not effectively build social
relationships that reduce the possibility of extreme violence. This happens
because the court has oriented itself around high-profile prosecutions of
individuals and has cooperated closely with states. There are real practical
reasons this is important for the survival of the ICC as an institution, but
acknowledging the political compromises involved reveals how this undermines
the court’s stated ends. On this point there is much the court could do by
reorienting its practice—challenging states that refer cases more directly, being
concerned with wider conditions that enable violence, and being more aware of
how states seek to use the court to their benefit. More problematic, however, is
that the court’s vision of worldwide authority is itself undemocratic and is as
much about securing the moral and legal authority of centralized global forms
of power as it is about empowering communities and individuals affected by
violence. This limitation is much more difficult to overcome, because it is less an
unintended consequence of the court’s actions and more a consequence of the
political project that lies behind its stated moral aims. There is not sufficient
space here to consider how the court might be remade to meet this objection,
especially because it would have to consider the wider ethos that motivates
international criminal law as a project. For now, thinking about the
undemocratic nature of the ICC both in principle and practice should give us
pause when celebrating the achievements of the court, forcing us to ask the
question, Who is served by such trials and investigations, and what good comes
of them? I do not want to suggest that the ICC cannot or has not done
important work, but rather that there is a limitation built into how the court
conceives of itself as an actor with the authority to hold others accountable, and
that we should hold the court itself accountable to standards that are focused on
the wishes, ideas, and needs of those who suffer, rather than the powerful
interests that normally define international justice as an ideal.

